

figure. However, hopefully, our programme will generate more qualitative information. The way we approach it is similar to storytelling: what are the practices that the artists came across while cooperating with other organizations; what did they learn; what aspects went wrong and how did the cooperating partners cope with it? As *The Art of Impact*, we are more interested in the dynamics and processes through which the partners arrived at an end product, and then, of course, in the end product itself. This is the starting point for the research.

KL: Are you, then, researching the impact on the producers or on the communities with which these producers or artists are working? What are you actually researching in regard to these projects?

MM: In my opinion it can be both in the end. But what we are very much interested in is the process: how do you get there? It's a kind of journey that the artists enter into with their partners. We try to analyse what they come across and what it means for them and for the cooperation. We are interested in how the process affects the cooperation and the end result, the goals they are aiming [to achieve].

TG: There are many different questions that can be touched upon by a work of art, or how they [artists] try to change perceptions of a certain topic. For me, I would like to think about impact as a change [that occurs] around a certain issue. This change could be the attitude of the people that are involved or the rules of the mechanism working around a certain issue. Are the people showing different kinds of behaviour or using a different language as a consequence of the project? Are there other goals they are focusing on? It could be on all these different levels that the change is being made through the collaboration.

KL: Previously you mentioned that this subsidy seeks to support sustainable projects. However, *The Art of Impact* is a temporary fund. In your opinion, how does the temporary nature of this subsidy affect the sustainability of the projects?

MM: We started the programme with the awareness that it would only last two years, and we try to see it as an experiment, as an opportunity to research the processes and dynamics of the funded projects. Therefore, this programme, in a way, is a pilot to learn lessons for the future and maybe one of these lessons is that public funds do not invest enough in long-term projects, or that there is not enough time to create the right context in which the artists want to operate.

Michel Munneke studied sociology and anthropology at the Catholic University of Nijmegen and obtained his PhD in Communication Science at the University of Amsterdam. From 1995 until 2000 he worked at the World Press Photo Foundation, becoming its director in 2001. Next to his position as programme director of *The Art of Impact*, Munneke is an advisor of the board of directors of Child Helpline International, and follows the Senior Leadership Programme at the Nyenrode Business University.

Tabo Goudswaard studied Fine Arts at the Gerrit Rietveld Academy of Amsterdam, after which he joined the No Academy, a post-graduate programme for social design in Amsterdam. As a social designer, Goudswaard searches for new ways of looking at social problems. He seeks to connect his work with people's everyday behaviour and designs new concrete perspectives for taking action, which are both shared with participants and produced together with them. It is his conviction that artists can play a crucial role in shaping societies.

\*Interview by Lara Garcia Diaz & Cristina Marques Moran

## AGENTS OR OBJECTS OF DISCONTINUOUS CHANGE? BLAIRITE BRITAIN AND THE ROLE OF THE CULTUREPRENEUR

Josephine Berry

In his epoch-defining book on the knowledge economy, *Living on Thin Air*, Charles Leadbeater advanced a crucial formulation: "The more rapid and discontinuous the nature of knowledge creation within an industry, the more conducive it is for entrepreneurship."<sup>1</sup> When seeking to understand the rise of the 'cultural entrepreneur' — or *culturepreneur* — in Britain in the 1990s, it is important to keep in mind how profound the experience of 'rapid and discontinuous change' was during this time. In a sense, the rise of the entrepreneur *per se*, as an economic ideal and governmental fetish, registers a popular awakening to the effects of a full-scale implementation of neoliberal policies and their engineering of endemic economic instability. Such policies swept away the social and economic compacts that had undergirded and stabilized society since the end of the Second World War. To contend with the 'creative destruction' of globalized and deregulated trade, the welfare state thus began its transition into the innovation state.

But beyond merely registering this systemic instability, the fetishized figure of the entrepreneur provided a conduit by which a general economic condition could be converted into a set of personal responsibilities and motivations. Neoliberalism demanded that an entirely new model of subjectivity be born. In 1990s Britain, it was the invented and unlikely figure of the *cultural* entrepreneur who most embodied the risk-taking individualism that was given as the model of success for thriving in new economic times. Here we will look at how this contradictory figure was engineered, and its lasting impact on the cultural landscape.

Fordism's demise in the early 1970s had brought about the end of jobs for life or the notion of a lifelong career. The end of economic stability had also, however, left governments with a historic *opportunity*. Finally, the on-going argument between those who believed that the collective insurance of the welfare state was an essential buffer to the market's destructive pursuit of profit, and those who believed that welfare costs were unaffordable could be settled. As an apparently unavoidable consequence of the changes in economic conditions, the social would now become entirely integrated into the economic. Neoliberalism is a political ideology that subjects all aspects of life (social, economic, biological, cultural, personal) to an economic judgement or audit; it is a perspective that no longer permits of any outside to the economic. In this respect, we can say that society as a whole was entrepreneurialized as an effect of neoliberalism. But below we will look specifically at culture, rapidly becoming the great white hope of deindustrialized times, and the story of its entrepreneurialization in 'Creative Britain'.<sup>2</sup>

### ENTREPRENEURIAL SALVATION

As Jacques Donzelot argues in his essay 'Pleasure in Work', at the very centre of this change is the transformation of the *subject of rights* who disidentifies with work into the *subject of change* who embraces and takes pleasure in work.<sup>3</sup> The Fordist worker, protected by statutory rights but threatened by unemployment and hence economic obsolescence, had become a real problem for government

<sup>1</sup> Charles Leadbeater, *Living on Thin Air: The New Economy*, London: Penguin Books, 1999, p. 104.

<sup>2</sup> 'Creative Britain' is the title of the 1998 book by Chris Smith, New Labour's Secretary of State for Culture, which laid out a vision for the culturepreneurialization of Britain. In it, Smith imagines the transformation of the British economy through the individualistic, innovative, and self-risking figure of the cultural producer. He also reimagines the role of arts funding in terms of a *financing* of entrepreneurial actors able to produce economic returns. For Robert Hewison, the phrase 'Creative Britain' "resonates throughout New Labour's time in office. And who could be against creativity? Creativity is positive and forward-looking — it is cool, just as New Labour wished to be." Robert Hewison, *Cultural Capital: The Rise and Fall of Creative Britain*, London/New York: Verso, 2014, p. 5.

<sup>3</sup> Jacques Donzelot, 'Pleasure in Work', in: Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, Peter Miller (eds.) [The Foucault Effect...] *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.

and the economy alike. The worker's rigidity and resistance to retraining had become both unaffordable for the public purse and a drag on the commercial need to innovate and compete in a global marketplace. By Donzelot's account, alienation from work and statutory rights were two sides of the same coin. The development of lifelong training, or formation permanente as it is called in France, as a standard technique of workplace practice from the end of the 1970s, and increasingly a condition of welfare provision from the 1980s, was therefore an essential aspect of neoliberalizing societies. This technique was able to integrate the 'right' of the worker to constant on-the-job training with the requirements of capital. The social molecule of neoliberal society is thus the development of what Foucault described as the entrepreneurial self.<sup>4</sup> Donzelot exposes the parallels between lifelong learning and the entrepreneurial attitude by quoting Bertrand Schwartz, the French educationalist who helped to develop its principles:

The objective of Formation Permanente is to make every person capable of becoming an agent of change, capable that is of an improved understanding of the technical, cultural and social world that surrounds him, and of acting upon and changing the structures within which he lives. It aims to give everyone an awareness of his power as an active being [...].<sup>5</sup>

The individual is made autonomous at the same time that their social and economic environment is defined as one of change; these new subjective freedoms come at the cost of perilous and permanent insecurity. Although written in 1971, this description of permanent formation works well as a description of the more contemporary figure of the 'cultural entrepreneur' or 'creative worker'. Pleasure in work is, after all, what cultural occupations have traditionally offered as recompense for chronic insecurity. It is also crucial to emphasize here that neoliberalism espouses a model of the subject that is both individually autonomous *and yet* collectively responsible. It becomes our duty to develop our skills and exercise our entrepreneurialism in order not to become a burden on collective resources and to help innovate and drive forward social and economic processes that will benefit all.<sup>6</sup> At the same time, it becomes the duty of the government to empower all individuals and businesses through the creation of opportunities for self-realization. This is the role of the so-called 'enabling state' which must provide what New Labour leader and prime minister Tony Blair called "competitive individualism within a moral framework".<sup>7</sup>

Thus the political transformations brought about by the crisis of the Fordist/welfare state model entailed a remaking of society in the image of the economy, or rather, the neoliberal economy importantly characterized by Joseph Schumpeter's theory. For Schumpeter, an Austrian economist who became a key neoliberal figurehead, economic *disequilibrium* is nothing to be feared but rather a sign of economic health. This idea was set out in his 1943 book, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* where he describes capitalism, with its on-going discovery of new markets, production techniques, and forms of organization as a process of incessant 'mutation', one that:

revolutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly creating a new one. This process of Creative Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism. It is what capitalism consists in, and what every capitalist concern has got to live in.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Michel Foucault, *Naissance de la biopolitique: Cours au collège de France (1978-1979)*, trans. as: *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France 1978-1979*, by Graham Burchell, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

<sup>5</sup> Bertrand Schwartz, 1971, cited in Donzelot, op. cit. (note 3), p. 273.

<sup>6</sup> We see this encapsulated in political formulae like the Tory's 'Big Society' used as a euphemism to cover over the deficiencies of the austerity state.

<sup>7</sup> Cited in Hewison, op. cit. (note 2), pp. 11-12.

Like Marx, Schumpeter believed that capitalism's inherent dynamic would lead ultimately to its own destruction. However Schumpeter's theory formulates destruction as the source of the system's own salvation — albeit a dynamic that will eventually overwhelm it. While every source of profit in a capitalist economy must eventually dry up due to the tendency of the market to imitate, saturate, and exhaust all innovations, such incessant levelling of difference also impels the creative thinking of the entrepreneur. Indeed for Schumpeter, economic value, or growth, does not derive from the surplus value extracted from labour time — as in Marx's labour theory of value — but from entrepreneurial innovation itself. Entrepreneurial creativity is itself as real an input into economic development as other factors of production — land, labour, and capital — and is in fact the decisive one that increases the total sum of values. While, for Schumpeter, socialist societies have no real mechanism for creative destruction, and therefore stagnate, capitalist societies impel the entrepreneur and are therefore innovative, dynamic, and expansive.

Before exploring in specific detail the nature of cultural entrepreneurship, it is also worth making two further observations. When Peter Drucker wrote his definitive theory of entrepreneurialism in 1985, *Innovation and Entrepreneurship*, he observed that while 'smokestack' industries had been haemorrhaging jobs since the 1970s, the US was undergoing more overall job creation than ever before in peace time.<sup>9</sup> This seemed to run contrary to common sense, since by 1984 the big Fortune 500 companies had permanently lost four to six million jobs, and the public sector had shrunk due to the slowing birth rate.<sup>10</sup> Yet since this permanent shrinkage had occurred, forty million new jobs had been added to the economy in small to medium sized businesses. Unsurprisingly, given the subject of the book, Drucker put this extraordinary anomaly down to the emergence in the US of a culture of entrepreneurship in which individuals were prepared to undertake risks and 'work like demons' creating their own start-ups rather than work in big companies and face uncertain futures. As I will discuss in more detail below, Drucker also attributes this cultural and psychological change to the rise of management techniques that had been transforming American society since the First World War. He writes: "Management is the new technology (rather than any specific new science of invention) that is making the American economy into an entrepreneurial economy."<sup>11</sup> For Drucker, management is a *social* technique that changes the yield of resources or the value and satisfaction obtained by consumers from resources: an inherently entrepreneurial innovation. Here, he uses the McDonald's restaurant chain as a key example, since they invented nothing except the process through which staff are trained and provided with the tools to deliver simple hamburgers in an efficient, fast, and standardized form to the customer. However, what is also very interesting about Drucker's account is the spin he gives entrepreneurship. Unlike advocates such as Schumpeter, Drucker emphasizes the socially *stabilizing* effects of entrepreneurship in the context of 'creative destruction'. Where the contemporary economic climate of the mid-1980s and its systematic destruction of big businesses was posing what he called a "genuine social threat to employment, financial stability and social order", and with the prospect of blue collar jobs shrinking by a third within the next twenty-five years, it was essential for existing businesses to learn to be successful entrepreneurs.<sup>12</sup> It is in this light, I think, that we should also see the discourse and policies that came to cluster around the *cultural* entrepreneur in the Blairite Britain of the late 1990s.

<sup>8</sup> Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy* (1943), London: Routledge, 2010, (fifth edition) pp. 82-83.

<sup>9</sup> Peter Drucker, *Innovation and Entrepreneurship* [1985], London: Routledge, 2015.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., p. 20.

In a sense, the discovery and hype of the cultural entrepreneur in the 1990s could be described as an act of entrepreneurship in its own right. Cultural creativity which had, by and large, been regarded as something fairly peripheral to the real economy, was discovered and converted into a resource of both national pride and economic growth: the 'cultural and creative industries'. It took an act of innovation to transform cultural creativity into a profit yielding resource. Furthermore, the discovery of this resource also entailed a very real desire to use it to help stabilize the economy more widely in times of discontinuous, often disastrous change, as per Drucker's proposal: a very difficult balancing act to pull off.

To retrace this a little, and with the help of cultural historian Robert Hewison's excellent account of Creative Britain, the discovery of creativity as an economic resource emerged gradually from the early to mid-1990s.<sup>13</sup> It was heavily bound up with attempts to reinvent the Labour Party in the guise of the centrist New Labour. A makeover also known as Third Way politics, named as such for its apparent marriage of state social provision and market economics, but today redolent of attempts to kill off the socialist ambitions of the party for good. Part of the rebranding of Labour entailed the need to align itself with the 'new economy' or 'knowledge economy' and to dissociate from the blue collar workers who were, according to Leadbeater, 'melting into thin air'.

Geoff Mulgan, director of the centre-left thinktank Demos, which would greatly influence New Labour's policies, had long criticized the gulf that existed between the "sphere of independent production and a tightly controlled, class-based sphere of public funding".<sup>14</sup> What he and others on the left were critical of, informed in no small part by the growing influence of cultural studies, was how government policy replicated cultural hierarchies. On the one hand, the government funded public culture, according to arms length principles, through a fairly unaccountable series of public bodies and their committees. On the other hand, commercial media had massified an almost entirely unsupported popular culture that didn't receive such funding. Yet it seemed to be the unsupported, entrepreneurial currents in culture that were gaining all the attention at this time. This disconnect between public funding, cultural policy, and economic development strategies is part of what Leadbeater and Kate Oakley called the 'missing middle' that, as they argued in their *The Independents* report of 1999, must be bridged in order to build up the creative economy and help it withstand global competition.<sup>15</sup>

Just a few years earlier, a new cultural wave had been formed by the twin phenomena of Britpop and the Young British Artists or YBAs. Britpop bands such as Oasis and Blur consciously and nostalgically evoked Britain in the swinging (and booming) 1960s, while the YBAs had grown up learning to fend for themselves in the dark years of Thatcherism. In 1988, their main representative and most consummate culturepreneur, Damien Hirst, had convinced the London Docklands Corporation to let him curate the group show *Freeze* in the London Port Authority Building in Surrey Docks (fig. 1). It caught the attention of advertising multi-millionaire and art collector Charles Saatchi who became a key patron, as well as Nicholas Serota, director of Tate, who made a high profile visit to the show. The spirit of the times seemed to be abolishing old cultural hierarchies, and that spirit was understood to be quintessentially entrepreneurial. While some identified themselves proudly, if slightly ironically, as British while others did not, this fresh crop of talent was blended together into a new brand dubbed 'Cool Britannia' that would be touted by New Labour after their election.<sup>16</sup> When prominent

<sup>12</sup>

Ibid.

<sup>13</sup>

Hewison, op. cit. (note 2).

<sup>14</sup>

Geoff Mulgan, cited in Hewison, op. cit. (note 2), p. 22.

<sup>15</sup>

Charles Leadbeater and Kate Oakley, *The Independents: Britain's New Cultural Entrepreneur*, London: Demos, 1999. Accessed through: [www.demos.co.uk/files/theindependents.pdf](http://www.demos.co.uk/files/theindependents.pdf), on 8 May 2016.

figures such as Oasis member Noel Gallagher publicly endorsed New Labour after their landslide victory in 1997, Cool Britannia and the youthful, modernizing spirit of New Labour were briefly fused in public perception.

This is more than a background event to New Labour's development of an entirely new approach to cultural policy; by some force of media synergy, Cool Britannia had helped Labour win a landslide election after decades in the political wilderness. With the help of the mainstream media and the World Wide Web, the newly democratized forces of culture were also making big waves both at home and abroad. The epoch defining YBA exhibition, *Sensation* (1997), stereotypically British films like *Four Weddings and a Funeral* (1994), and pop hits such as Pulp's *Common People* (1995), seemed to show Britain as exerting a powerful degree of cultural influence on the global stage far in excess of its size. In 1988, John Myserscough had written a report called 'The Economic Importance of the Arts', which was one of the first to quantify the contribution of the arts to the GDP, at around 1.28%.<sup>17</sup> A decade later, in 1998, Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, Chris Smith, commented that the convergence of culture and media revealed, "a whole industrial sector that no one hitherto has even conceived of as an industry."<sup>18</sup> The Creative Industries Task Force, established by the government the year before, in 1997, was the first to synthesize a scattered field of activities into the 'cultural and creative industries' in their Mapping Document — published first in 1998, and then in revised form in 2001.

<sup>16</sup>

While 'Cool Britannia' was originally a pop song by Bonzo Dog Doo Dah Band in 1967, and later registered by Ben & Jerry's as an ice cream flavour in 1996, it was subsequently adopted by Conservative and Labour parties alike in the run-up to the 1997 elections to articulate the new cultural euphoria generated by Britpop and the YBAs.



fig. 1 Just prior to *Freeze* private view. From Left to right: Ian Davenport, Damien Hirst, Angela Bulloch, Fiona Rae, Steve Parks, Anya Gallaccio, Sarah Lucas and Gary Hume. August 1988. (Photo: Abigail Lane © Abigail Lane. All Rights Reserved, DACS 2016)

For all the buzz of discovery, New Labour were confronted with the very real problem of how to draft effective policy for this brand new industrial sector that was punching so high above its weight yet lacking any structural coherence. Here, the entrepreneurial individual enters the stage once more, this time not as the subject of workplace self-management and lifelong learning, but as an elusive figure sitting at the intersection between creative ideas and new technologies, zones of esoteric knowledge, and the products, distribution channels, and markets of the future—a master of the ‘art of combinations’, in Schumpeter’s formulation. If creativity was to be industrialized, it needed to be locatable in an amenable form or figure, and the culturepreneur seemed to offer just that. The new economy had been producing some veritable giants of entrepreneurship—most notably Bill Gates—that helped sell this new, abstract figure.<sup>19</sup> In Leadbeater’s *Living on Thin Air*, Bill Gates is described as the archetypal ‘knowledge entrepreneur’: “someone who has built a global business from virtually nothing on the basis of a few good ideas and some ruthless commercial strategy.”<sup>20</sup>

Leadbeater’s 1999 book was a de facto mission statement for the Blairite policy on stimulating the knowledge economy that carried an endorsement by Tony Blair on its cover. In it, Leadbeater emphasizes the nearly alchemical power of the new economy to turn know-how, good instincts, and ideas into money (while all details of Gates’ years of coding graft, not to mention those of the wider developer community remained unacknowledged). His definition of the ‘knowledge entrepreneur’ is closer to Schumpeter than to Drucker, emphasizing personality traits such as ruthlessness, charisma, confidence, inquisitiveness, imagination and above all the ability to *act on instinct*. By contrast, Drucker stresses time and again that entrepreneurialism is based on a systematic approach to innovation: “it is behaviour rather than a personality trait” he writes, and adds, “the entrepreneur always searches for change, responds to it, and exploits it as an opportunity.”<sup>21</sup> And locating or pre-empting change is for Drucker the result of a systematic search, not something that happens to the entrepreneur when the muse kisses him.<sup>22</sup> Leadbeater doesn’t deny the need for systematicity, but he rolls together creative invention with business innovation. On the one hand, the TV cook Delia Smith is upheld as a paragon, able to turn her know-how and craft into a successful product line. On the other, he admits that knowledge-based businesses often bring together two partners: “one with the ideas, the other with the business skills.”<sup>23</sup> Yet what defines a successful idea, and where does creativity really lie? Is ‘the commercial application of creativity’ defined by the Windows operating system, a top charting pop song or the conversion of the traditional hamburger into a management science? This confusion between creativity and systematic innovation will constantly return to haunt not just theories of the knowledge and cultural entrepreneur, but the creative industries sector in general.

#### DISCONTINUOUS CHANGE OR SYSTEMATIC DOMINATION?

But confusion, such as that produced by discontinuous change, also creates the essential conditions in which the entrepreneur can seize opportunities. As Leadbeater explains, “[e]ntrepreneurs in new

industries exploit gaps created by disagreements over the value of a new idea; they thrive on the short-sighted arrogance of large companies.”<sup>24</sup> Being able to see through the fog of ideas and rapid churn of new businesses and products is at least half the art. In Leadbeater and Oakley’s 1999 *The Independents* report, written for Demos, in which the term ‘cultural entrepreneur’ was first popularized, the creative urban milieu is itself characterized in conflictual terms: “[c]reative places are rarely settled and cosy; they are usually in the midst of battles between ‘old’ and ‘new’ sources of wealth, income and identity.”<sup>25</sup> Seeing potential in the decline of the old, and having the social and economic power to act on this, is thus necessary for finding the differentials (such as rent gaps) in which future profits lie. This is a differential entirely absent from today’s purpose built, high-rent creative quarters. However, the role of high rents in levelling off potential culturepreneurial returns on risk-taking is a topic worthy of its own dedicated discussion—Richard Florida’s creative quarters immediately having become unaffordable for the very ‘creatives’ who settled them.

Implicit in this image of discontinuous change and the entrepreneurial gift for seeing or systematically creating the future is the high propensity for failure; something that is acknowledged by all theories of the entrepreneur, old or new, cultural or industrial. For Drucker, this is often a consequence of mistaking technological invention for entrepreneurial innovation. In 1985, he cautioned: “Most of Silicon Valley [...] are still inventors rather than innovators, still speculators rather than entrepreneurs.”<sup>26</sup> Leadbeater and Oakley are also highly sensitive to the trade-off cultural entrepreneurs are willing to make between autonomy and insecurity, outlining their general model of survival on a combination of project work, e-lancing, and job hopping. Here they emphasize the youthfulness of the sector, which suggests the difficulty of maintaining this form of work long-term, especially when family commitments develop—a problem quickly identified by creative economy theorist Angela McRobbie.<sup>27</sup>

Creativity, we must conclude, is not necessarily a direct tool of entrepreneurship, but often entrepreneurship is required as a necessary means for supporting the creativity that makes work meaningful and pleasurable for the post-Fordist worker. Engineering the necessary cocktail of creativity and business skills is in fact the main aim of the policy recommendations outlined in ‘The Independents’, revealing how Britain’s new cultural entrepreneur was less a sociological type than a figure yet to be created through targeted policies. The fragility of the many culturepreneurial microbusinesses discussed in the report relates to what Leadbeater and Oakley see as the former’s ‘ambivalence’ towards the market and making money: “[i]n ways they are non-materialistic. They are prepared to earn relatively little—most people we interviewed were earning £10,000 to £20,000 [per annum]—for long periods as the price of doing what they want to do.”<sup>28</sup> Nevertheless, they continue. This doesn’t mean culturepreneurs are into ‘art for art’s sake’; but rather than wanting to entrepreneurialize their way to success, they want to ‘have a hit’ or ‘be discovered’.<sup>29</sup>

Herein lies the heart of the contradiction. For many of the graphic designers, coders, animators, web designers, and fashion designers interviewed for their report, entrepreneurialism is in fact a quite foreign logic and behaviour. As Drucker says, when a family business opens another restaurant, they take a risk, but they do not innovate. This can equally well be said of a small web design company taking on a new member of staff. By contrast, he continues, when Cyrus McCormick invented instalment buying for agricultural machinery in the early twentieth century, farmers were able to buy harvesting machines out of future earnings, not past

<sup>17</sup> John Myerscough, *The Economic Importance of the Arts in Britain*, Policy Studies Institute, 1988. This was a far more modest figure than the Blair government’s Creative Industries Task Force would give in their Creative Industries Mapping Document of 1998, in which they claimed the sector contributed 4% to GDP. When they released a second mapping document in 2001, the figure had jumped again to 5%. However this figure has been shown to alter dramatically depending on whether or not, for example, sectors of software production deemed ‘uncreative’ are included or not. See NESTA’s *A Dynamic Mapping of the UK’s Creative Industries*, 2013 for a discussion of the difficulty of defining and thus measuring the creative industries, and the need to disentangle kinds of (uncreative) labour from kinds of (creative) products. Accessed through: [www.nesta.org.uk/publications/dynamic-mapping-uks-creative-industries](http://www.nesta.org.uk/publications/dynamic-mapping-uks-creative-industries), on 8 May 2016.

<sup>18</sup> Chris Smith, cited in Hewison, op. cit. (note 2), p. 28.

<sup>19</sup> The neologism ‘creative and cultural industries’ deployed by the Creative Industries Task Force effected a definitional blurring of the arts with the knowledge economy more generally. Key to this governmental reordering were the reevaluation of the arts in terms of their economic contribution and the whitewashing of the knowledge economy’s aggressive attempts at intellectual property expansion by invoking its creative contribution. See Simon Roodhouse, ‘The Creative Industries: Definitions, Quantification and Practice’ in Christiane Eisenberg et al. (eds.), *Cultural Industries: The British Experience in International Perspective*, Humboldt University Berlin, Edoc-Server, 2006. Accessed through: <http://edoc.hu-berlin.de/conferences/culturalindustries/proc/culturalindustries.pdf>, on 8 May 2016.

<sup>20</sup> Leadbeater, op. cit. (note 1), p. 98.

<sup>21</sup> Drucker, op. cit. (note 9), p. xiv.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., p. xxi.

<sup>23</sup> Leadbeater, op. cit. (note 1), p. 101.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., p. 105.

<sup>25</sup> Charles Leadbeater and Kate Oakley, op. cit. (note 15), p. 35.

<sup>26</sup> Peter Drucker, op. cit. (note 9), p. 13.

<sup>27</sup> Angela McRobbie, ‘Clubs to Companies: Notes on the Decline of Political Culture in Speeded Up Creative Worlds’, *Cultural Studies* 16(4), Abingdon-on-Thames: Routledge/Taylor & Francis, 2002, pp. 516–531.

<sup>28</sup> Leadbeater and Oakley, op. cit. (note 15), p. 23.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

savings. McCormick was an innovator because he endowed a new resource — future earnings — with the capacity to create wealth. One could say the same of the decision to fuse the computer with the mobile phone to create smart phones. As mentioned above, Drucker argues that together with innovation, the basic ‘techné’ or useful knowledge required for entrepreneurship is, above all, management. What is striking here is the distance between notions of management and notions of creativity, for a key aspect of management is its power to impose order, uniformity, and unity across differences. For instance, management enables people with different skills and knowledge to work together in a coordinated organization. This production of systems of integration and uniformity is, at least from a conventional standpoint, the very opposite of creativity’s singularizing power.

Having the expertise and time to develop effective management techniques on the one hand, and to innovate new resources for wealth creation on the other, requires systematicity in itself as well as the breathing operational space that usually comes at the cost of a business’s core productive activity. All this begs the question, how do you systematically manage creativity? Eschewing this conundrum, as Leadbeater and Oakley point out, the culturepreneur tends to cherish the intimate and creative character of their business rather than the creation of new resources and markets, with few ever even going to a bank or outside investor to raise money. Their maxim is to “work hard and stay balanced”.<sup>30</sup>

Again, Drucker is emphatic: it is the existing, successful operation that is an obstacle to entrepreneurship. Operating anything from an industrial plant to a product-line to a distribution system requires constant effort to deal with daily crises: “existing operations demand and deserve priority treatment”, he insists.<sup>31</sup> It takes a special effort for an existing business to become entrepreneurial, and existing resources tend to be allocated to existing production. This is where management and innovation really come together in his description, for to innovate requires a highly managerial approach to running a business.

Innovation, in other words, must be systematically cultivated through making it attractive and beneficial to managers and staff, through reallocating resources from present production, and risking the disruption of the current business model in the process (which is what, for Schumpeter, did not happen in the Soviet Union). Reading Drucker, it is easy to understand the reasons for Google employing such a panoply of game activities, forums, therapies, practices, and values conducive to brain storming in its famous ‘campus style’ Googleplex and outer-ring of bought-out start ups. But while knowledge economy success stories like Google, Microsoft, and Apple were talked up by Leadbeater as converting thin air into hard cash, the reality is that their successes rely on many ‘hidden’ yet all too tangible and historically rooted relations of geopolitical advantage and exploitation — not just entrepreneurial verve.<sup>32</sup> Hardly a matter of thin air, and hardly irrelevant to the prospects of would-be cultural entrepreneurs.

This may all seem rather distant from the question of culturepreneurship, yet the two are intimately related. As Leadbeater and Oakley worried in 1999, the UK was in danger of creating industries




fig. 2 ‘Steve Jobs Vector Portrait’, accessed through: vectorportal.com, on 1 July 2016.

<sup>30</sup> Charles Leadbeater and Kate Oakley, op. cit. (note 15), p. 23.

<sup>31</sup> Drukker, op. cit. (note 9) p. x.

dominated by ‘digital craft producers’, who were all too liable to go bust or be “dominated by larger international groups that will control distribution and publishing of their products”.<sup>33</sup> The irony is that knowledge economy boosters like Leadbeater and Richard Florida have used the example of Bill Gates and Steve Jobs to promote the figure of the cultural entrepreneur, while at the same time much of their policy relates to the kinds of small to medium sized businesses that are highly vulnerable to the inequalities of the global marketplace posed by giants such as these. This marketplace inequality makes the millennial entrepreneurship of the creative economy impossible to compare to the late nineteenth and early twentieth century flowering of entrepreneurship which Drucker and Leadbeater both hark back to in glowing and nostalgic terms. This mythical time of business creation happened in the absence of the ruthless Darwinism of today’s global market place intensified by digital networks, hostile mergers, and financial instruments. This begs the question at what point the forces of creative destruction start to overwhelm the power of the entrepreneur to take advantage of them?

It is a telling fact that, according to Robert Hewison’s account, it was the music magazine the *New Musical Express* (*NME*) that called time on Cool Britannia when it ran the Sex Pistol Johnnie Rotten’s slogan, ‘Ever get the feeling you’ve been cheated?’ on its cover in March 1998 (fig. 3). This issue poured scorn on New Labour’s introduction of its workfare-style benefit misleadingly called the New Deal (not to be confused with Roosevelt’s New Deal of the 1930s), whose stated purpose was to reduce unemployment by providing training, subsidized employment, and voluntary work to the unemployed. The benefit would be withdrawn from anyone who ‘refused reasonable employment’. Thus, as we saw at the outset, entrepreneurialism, or flexibilization, was used as much as a disciplinary tool with which to attack the defences of working class militancy as it was to create an ideal social type. The 1990s creative workers were likewise exposed to this two-pronged attack: both deprived of the state provision which formerly provided resources for creative production (such as those enjoyed by Brit Pop bands), and *demande*d to create as a matter of economic survival or a prerequisite of contemporary forms of employment.

One of further difficulty for today’s ‘creatives’ is that they seem to have no simple or single position within the economy. Despite Florida’s attempts to identify artists, musicians, actors, performers, filmmakers, and designers as the ‘super creative core’ around which both professional and service classes concentrically cluster, as Hewison writes,

The reality for creators of expressive value was that they are not at the core of anything. In Britain they depend on a network that includes the education sector, the subsidized cultural sector, and the all-important publicly funded BBC — as well as purely commercial enterprises, which also often depend on the publicly supported part of the network to generate the content from which they can profit.<sup>34</sup>

Seen in this light, cultural entrepreneurship appears as the way to justify the withdrawal of public funding, fictionalizing a hybridization of creativity and business acumen. In reality these two qualities are usually either inimical or extremely difficult to integrate in the absence of meaningful public interventions such as subsidized workspaces, commissions, training, consultancy, or loans. In 2007, the Work Foundation published *Staying Ahead: The Economic Performance*

<sup>32</sup> For instance, workers in Silicon Valley will get paid handsomely in order to develop the design and brand values which allow Apple to charge such excessive amounts for its products that in reality are extremely cheap to produce. The low cost of production is guaranteed by the company’s exploitation of cheap Chinese labour in factories like Foxconn (which were recently found to have broken up to 86 labour laws, including forcing pregnant women to work 11 hour days, six days a week, standing up). Their global supply chains also make it possible for the technology giants to hold billions of dollars of profits offshore, thus evading paying taxes that could help stimulate the economy at a grassroots level. See Sander, ‘Artificial Scarcity in a World of Overproduction: An Escape that Isn’t’, *Mute* Vol 2 #16 2010. Accessed through: www.metamute.org/editorial/articles/artificial-scarcity-world-overproduction-escape-isnt, on 8 May 2016.

<sup>33</sup> Leadbeater & Oakley, op. cit. (note 15), p. 30.

<sup>34</sup> Hewison, op. cit. (note 2), p. 45.

of the UK's Creative Industries, and concluded that there was a strong case for 'public investment', i.e. subsidy for those creators of the 'expressive core'. But instead, 2011 saw the Arts Council budget cut by 29.6%. The situation is quite circular: without funding, cultural producers are compelled to entrepreneurialize or change careers altogether.

Thus 'pleasure in work' is becoming ever more nakedly an alibi for the imposition of 'formation permanente' and its economic analogue, creative destruction. While the entrepreneur historically implied the catalyzing 'agent of change' referred to by Schwartz and eulogized by Schumpeter, today it tends to be associated with obligatory and conformist forms of subjectivity. Thus, paradoxically, free creative action is imposed on workers, artists, and capitalists alike as a generic behavioural injunction within a highly precarious economic climate. The values of creativity are everywhere lauded, yet in their forced embrace with entrepreneurship, hunted back to a minimum of possibility. As mass creative workers we are all thus increasingly objects, not subjects, of discontinuous change. And as we have seen, entrepreneurialism is something quite distinct from cultural or technological invention, requiring time, management skills, organizational resources, and the right kind of instincts. In the UK and beyond, the impact of culture's enforced entrepreneurialization is still emerging. Yet what seems undeniable is that for those working in the creative sector, whether hub or rim, their output will need to be highly market compatible if they are to stand a hope of surviving. The toll this will take on what once was called autonomous or critical culture is apparent. In the increasing absence of any alternatives, the age of the culturepreneur is at last truly upon us.

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


fig. 3 Cover of *New Musical Express*, 14 March 1998.