**Round the Houses: homeownership and failures of asset-based welfare in the United Kingdom**

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Abstract

This article explores the contingencies of financialisation and housing. More specifically, how the spatial and temporal dynamics of the UK housing market ensure homeownership does not (and arguably cannot) deliver welfare provision in the way envisioned by asset-based welfare initiatives. The first section demonstrates the fundamental problem of conceptualising households as asset-holders; in particular with regards to housing-based welfare strategies and as part of financialised growth strategies in the UK, more generally. We show that continuing to assume residential housing is a static and unchanging asset-class depoliticizes how asset-based welfare intensifies household indebtedness. The second section demonstrates the temporal, spatial and social limits of homeownership in the UK. We argue that the financialisation of housing in the UK is a unique set of political and economic circumstances that cannot be repeated; therefore, current gains from residential housing are a one-off wealth windfall to particular (lucky) groups within society. The temporal and spatial limits of gains from residential housing mean the same conditions cannot be repeated (often enough) in the way required for residential housing to provide a generalizable welfare function. Finally the article concludes by suggesting the potential of new research that incorporates temporal, spatial and social contingencies of housing to demonstrate how financialisation materialises in everyday life.

*Financialisation, Housing, Asset-Based Welfare, UK, Financial Crisis, Everyday life*

Introduction

There is little doubt about the significance of housing in contemporary Britain (Dorling 2014). This article explores the contingencies of financialisation and housing. More specifically, how the spatial and temporal dynamics of the UK housing market ensure homeownership does not (and arguably cannot) deliver welfare provision, at least in the way envisioned by asset-based welfare initiatives. This speaks to on-going efforts to re-conceptualise financialisation, within the new political economy tradition, as spatially constituted (French, Leyshon, *et al.* 2011), temporally bound (Engelen *et al.* 2011) and deeply socially unequal (Dymski 2009; Wyly *et al.* 2009). This article argues that the welfare gains of homeownership are temporally, spatially and socially contingent, meaning only certain groups of homeowners, i.e., particular age groups and those living in urban and suburban areas benefited from residential housing in the way that could be called asset-based welfare. Moreover, housing-based welfare created new intergenerational inequalities and an enormous debt overhang that continues to plague the British economy.

As the title suggest, the current growth regime offers a ‘round the houses’ way of delivering welfare provision: beginning at the Bank of England with easy credit that flows through the investment and retail banking system, filtering into the real estate and other financial services sectors (lawyers, insurers, etc.) and, potentially, fuelling consumption in construction and other trades linked to the housing market. Households take on a large amount of high-cost debt (especially compared to the rates the banks borrow at) and depending on when and where they bought their home, households *may* realise wealth gains sometime in the future. This system constitutes ‘trickle-down’ welfare, where the windfall gains of a small group are considered sufficient to fuel gains for the rest of society. In short, the Anglo-American financialised growth accepts high levels of inequality that do not substantially improve; in fact, new inequalities are created by promoting homeownership as a form of welfare provision. Not only that, the inexorable links between housing and finance means that these imbalances exacerbate economic instability and stagnation.

The widely acknowledged interconnections between financial markets, residential housing form part of a wider financialised growth regime in the United Kingdom, which extends across the Anglosphere (Hay 2013a). In this context financialisation is a highly adaptive configuration of complementary institutional forms, networks and social norms, which coalesce into a coherent (at least for a time) set of social relations that are both complementary and conflicting (Jessop and Sum 2006; Jessop 2014). Initially, finance-led growth explained how easy credit offered households asset-based wealth gains in the form of housing and portfolio investments to compensate for income loss due to stagnating wage growth (Boyer 2000). Colin Crouch (2009) called it ‘privatised Keynesianism’ where economic stability, effective demand and welfare provision are generated through housing and capital markets rather than through employment and production like in the immediate post-war period. Colin Hay (2011) described the period of boom and bubble as the ‘Anglo-liberal’ growth model, which relied on consumer-led growth financed with private debt but also supported by high levels of public expenditure. Here ‘financialised’ growth is understood relative to what came before; namely that it emerged from the unravelling of the Fordist compromise (Crouch 2009: 384) and the strategic transformation in finance as a response to the difficulties encountered with the advent of neoliberalism (Dymski 2009: 150). These processes coalesce to form a recognisable ‘growth model’ in which residential mortgage lending absorbs the cheap credit made available by the central banks to drive growth in the financial services, construction and consumer spending while also driving asset prices even higher (Hay 2013b, Gamble 2010).

More specifically, the financialisation of housing signalled an important transformation; securitisation fundamentally re-shaped the socio-economic landscape (Aalbers 2008; Wainwright 2009; Gotham 2009) and the politics of homeownership directly linked the domestic political economy to global financial flows through secondary mortgage markets (Schwatz and Seabrooke 2008). The Varieties of Residential Capitalism offers a similar way of conceptualising the complexities of the housing-finance nexus by comparatively demonstrating the links between the national politics of housing policy and international credit markets (Seabrooke and Schwartz 2008). VoRC evaluates the interplay between ownership rates and degrees of financial liberalisation in a way that re-imagines the ‘housing as a complex welfare good’ literature in light of the socio-political significance of homeownership (Saunders 1990). Traditionally, the welfare function of housing was understood to be a non-market service provided by the welfare state (Torgersen 1987; Harloe 1995). Castles (1998) introduced housing to the welfare regime framework, arguing that there is a ‘really big trade-off’ between homeownership and welfare provision (see also: Kemeny 1995, 2005); which is now used to explain why liberal welfare state privilege high homeownership rates over higher pension and welfare payments (Ferragina and Seeleib-Kaiser 2011; Lowe 2004; Malpass 2008). As such, national housing strategies relate to pensions systems and the general welfare state with implications for the overall working of the economy, social stratification and everyday perceptions of housing (Dewilde and Raeymaeckers 2008; Seabrooke 2012; Schwartz 2012).

Whether the emphasis is on how housing forms part of financialised growth model or how the housing-finance nexus creates a particular form of national capitalist development, both offer an important contribution to understanding the complex mechanism (either causal or structural) that make up the phenomenon of macroeconomic growth. Furthermore, they explain why the growth model or regime is unstainable and, in many instances, how it is inherently neoliberal. Most relevant here is how financialised growth strategies cultivated a particular form of house-price Keynesianism (Watson 2010) as part of its asset-based welfare strategies (Doling and Ronald 2010a, Ronald 2008). Ultimately this served to institutionalise residential housing and unchecked house-price inflation in an effort to transform how the state delivers welfare provisions. Also, it is increasingly clear that financialised housing is deeply implicated in the current economic malaise stemming directly from the failures of the financialised growth model:

A long-standing pathology of British capitalism has been the cost of capital—and it re-emerges again as a problem today at a time when the transition to any new growth model is likely to require significant levels of investment. It might seem counter-intuitive to point here to the *cost* rather than the *supply* of capital—after all, the base rate is as low today as it has ever been. Yet, despite this, the terms under which capital is supplied are far from favourable—with very similar interest rate spreads to those we have seen open up in mortgage lending. Credit is essentially still being rationed through punitive interest rates and this is crowding out investment (Hay 2013b: 33).

In other words, the crux of the problems facing the post-crisis Britain political economy is the high-cost of capital and how this is manifest through the housing market—a central pillar of financialised growth.

These interventions are important, however, we seek to highlight the problem of attributing such a degree of coherence to financialised growth, in general, and asset-based welfare through housing, in particular. The financialisation of housing is wrought with contingencies, ruptures and material limits which are not adequately accounted for when conceptualising a growth model or variety of capitalism. Financialisation is a process of change, be it political economic or socio-cultural, not simply a series of structural mechanism that explain what caused the Boom, Bubble and Bust in the UK, or wider Anglo-American growth model. Therefore, the aim is here is to extend the existing literature to better accounts for the conceptual and material contingencies that delimit housing-based welfare strategies and ultimately shape the possibilities for economic renewal.

The next section demonstrates the fundamental problem of conceptualising households as asset-holders; in particular with regards to housing-based welfare strategies and as part of financialised growth strategies in the UK, more generally. Too often analyses of the macro-economy rely on disaggregated picture of ‘the household sector’ that is then treated as equivalent to ‘households’. Doing so silences the significant inequalities between households, but also neutralises important transformations within the household. We show how housing is transformed from a ‘safe as houses’ asset to a highly leveraged debt vehicle and that continuing to assume residential housing is a static and unchanging asset-class depoliticizes how asset-based welfare intensifies household indebtedness. The following section extends the critique of housing-based welfare to include its temporal, spatial and social limits. It argues that the financialisation of housing in the UK is a unique set of political and economic circumstances that cannot be repeated; therefore, current gains from residential housing are a one-off wealth windfall to particular (lucky) groups within society. The temporal and spatial limits of gains from residential housing mean the same conditions cannot be repeated (often enough) in the way required for residential housing to provide a generalizable welfare function. Finally the article concludes by suggesting the potential of new research that incorporates temporal, spatial and social contingencies of housing to demonstrate how financialisation materialises in everyday life.

Problematising the household as ‘asset-holder’

It is generally understood that asset-based welfare strategies originated as an attempt to replace public-funded cash welfare programmes with benefits that contribute to asset accumulation financed through indirect methods, such as credit subsidies and tax deductions (Sherraden 1991); the stated aim is to diversify households dependence on income through greater levels of asset ownership (McKernan and Sherraden 2008). Policies are then devised to enable households to provide their own financial security by investing in portfolio funds and/or property markets. For example in the UK, early initiatives were the Treasury consultations *Savings and assets for all* (HM Treasury 2001) and in *Delivering savings and assets* (HM Treasury 2001a) right through to the present-day *Affordable Home Ownership*  schemes (DCLG 2013) and *Pension Auto-Enrolment* (Pensions Regulator 2013) programs where the government directly promotes greater asset-ownership for households. These policies explicitly stress a new approach to social policy where the state seeks to foster certain characteristics in its citizens, such as prudent savings habits, investing in pensions and homeownership (Hewitt 2002). In the UK these policy initiatives institutionalised finance in the social and cultural fabric of British society (Finlayson 2008, 2009; Levitas 2005) by cultivating ‘subjects who, self-consciously and responsibly, further their own freedom and security through the market in general and the financial market in particular’ (Langley 2006: 924).

Therefore, housing-based welfare strategies seek to promote ‘the welfare-function of housing’ which relies on two principle assumptions: first, the home is a store of wealth allowing households to redistribute this wealth over the life cycle; and, second the home is a reserve of cash, inasmuch as the equity stake can be converted into money through additional borrowing. Inscribed in the welfare-function of housing are two highly contentious assumption about how households hold assets and accumulate wealth over ‘the life-cycle’.

Firstly, it is through the notion of the ‘life-cycle’ that residential housing is able to mimic many of the primary functions of the liberal welfare state (Kemeny 2005). To sum it up briefly: a first-time homebuyer is supposed to be relatively young, making mortgage payments throughout the first half of his or her working life until the mortgage is paid off; then, when earning potential is at its highest later in working life, the mortgage is paid and income can be invested in a wider portfolio of assets. Then when an individual retires, the home is sold as a one-off cash windfall to fund retirement. In this respect, housing acts as a pension, in which contributions are made throughout working life in order to build a wealth holding substantial enough to draw on when an individual exits the paid labour force. The first problem is that the life-cycle assumes a balance between income, assets, savings and debt changes across an adult’s lifetime; more problematically, it assumes stable economic growth, low unemployment, stable working careers and a numerical balance between birth cohorts. However, financialisation fundamentally changed the UK economy destroying these very economic conditions. In this context the life-cycle is not a predictive concept to explain how individuals will borrow and save; rather it is a normative concept that inscribes ideals about how individuals should behave in growing, stable and balanced *a priori* economy. However logical, and necessary, these assumptions are to construct a model of asset-based welfare they rely on a temporal erasure of socio-cultural change; in short, the last 30-40 years of economic conditions are unthinkingly used as a predictor of the next 30-40 years. We know that financialisation has fundamentally changed the housing market and, in doing so, transformed the life-course of different cohorts (McKee 2012).

Also, there is a fundamental problem with the notion of households as asset-holders; in particular as it relates to housing-based welfare strategies and as part of financialised growth strategies in the UK more generally. Primarily it relies on a disaggregated notion of ‘the household sector’ as equivalent to households, which erases all the significant inequalities between households. The problem is not whether households can hold or accumulate assets, but rather do households hold and accumulate assets in the way required for the asset-based welfare model work. The key failing is the belief that households can transcend the limits of their earned income, namely by investing in assets like residential property or portfolio funds. However, wages and salaries remain the single biggest source of income for over two-thirds of households and for the vast majority of households their primary residence is their only major asset (Diacon et al.,2009; Froud *et al.* 2010, pp. 152).

Figure 1 from the most recent Wealth in Great Britain Report (ONS 2014) shows the distribution of all different forms of wealth and, as expected, shows large inequalities between the bottom and the top deciles. Housing wealth in 2010/12, like other forms of wealth, is unequally distributed; we can see that housing wealth (the bottom and darkest segment of bar graph) component of overall wealth holdings is virtual absence from the first three deciles and the meagre holdings in the entire bottom half of the distribution. There are big differences in the middle of the distribution: housing wealth is £97.6 billion for the 5th decile and double that-£200 billion-in the 6the decile (ONS, *Wealth in Great Britain* 2014). Therefore, making residential housing an asset class simply means housing-based welfare strategies re-enforce existing wealth inequalities because house price inflation will concentrate wealth gains at the top end of the distribution and serve to make housing more unaffordable for those lower down the distribution.

**Figure 1: Breakdown of aggregate total wealth, by deciles and components: Great Britain, 2010/12**

Importantly the financialisation of housing and post-2001 easy credit conditions did not substantially increase homeownership rates. From 1981 to 1991, owner-occupancy increased most rapidly from 60 per cent to 67 per cent, mainly as a result of the Right-to-Buy initiative. Easing credit conditions that ushered in the boom years initially pushed owner occupancy rates up, reaching a peak of 72 per cent in 2005, but then fell back down to around 65 per cent and remains so today (EHS, *Headline Report* 2013). Therefore, asset-based welfare expects households to strategically allocate their earnings to buy their homes, build their investments portfolios, fund consumption, protect against uncertainty and create wealth for future financial security. However, persistently stagnating income growth for the majority of households—now coined the cost-of-living crisis—only inhibits expanding asset-ownership by households. As such, the very notion of the household as asset-holder becomes a normative description of policy objectives: to download the welfare responsibilities to households that already are homeowners.

Obviously there are winners and losers in the housing market (Hamnet 1990); however, the issue here is not who gains and who loses but how financialisation is transformative, in this case how housing has transformed from a ‘safe as houses’ asset to a highly leveraged debt vehicle. Continuing to assume residential housing as a static and unchanging asset-class depoliticizes how asset-based welfare intensifies household indebtedness. When households take on huge debt during the housing market upswing, they do so under good credit conditions and with the expectation of ongoing upward trajectory in house prices. During the downswing, liquidity dries up and credit becomes inaccessible and expensive, confronting households with new financial insecurity: without credit-based cash reserves and/or arrears on their mortgage. As households cannot know or control the housing market a gain or loss from house price fluctuations is, ostensibly, luck. This means that some households were able to buy at the right time and realize significant wealth gains, while other households purchased highly leveraged assets in the middle of a bubble and consequently exposed to external factors such as liquidity in global credit market; other households were priced out of housing altogether. Therefore, residential housing can be a wealth-generating asset or a highly-leveraged vehicle capable of decimating the household’s entire financial security.

By privileging residential housing as an asset-class, rather than a socio-economic good (Ronald and Doling 2012) asset-based welfare strategies actually created ever-greater levels debt accumulation which may or may not translate into wealth gains for households. Falling interest rates, securitization and loosening lending criteria allowed ever-higher rates of mortgage lending to households; in turn, increasing leverage ratios was necessary to support asset-price inflation in residential housing—this virtuous-circle of increasing debts matched by ever-higher asset values that made asset-based welfare strategies appear plausible.

The significant outcome, with arguably the most long-lasting effects, is the pronounced debt overhang created by the housing boom, which is only compounded by household borrowing during the economic downturn. Figure 2 shows the Bank of England measure of outstanding secured lending, or the stock of mortgage debt owed by individuals and housing associations excluding loans securitised to non-resident companies; therefore, figure 1 is provides a limited approximation the stock of mortgage debt owed by households. Nevertheless, the timing and direction of the trend is clear, asset-based welfare strategies coincide with ever-higher stocks of mortgage debt.

**Figure 2: Amount Outstanding for secured loans to individuals and housing associations**

Significantly, mortgage debt is unevenly distributed: in 2012-3, of the 65 per cent of the UK population that are owner-occupiers approximately half owned their home outright and the other half with a mortgage. Outright owners were mainly in the older age groups, with 60 per cent of them aged 65 or over, reflecting the likelihood that the majority of this group once had mortgages and had paid them off (EHS, *Headline Report* 2013). Therefore, mortgage debts are largely held by younger households and are much higher, because the direct outcome of higher property prices is larger mortgages. We can see this clearly in the household-based Wealth and Assets Survey (WAS) which reports the median value of household mortgage debt (for household with outstanding mortgages) increased by 14% over six years: in 2010/12, £80,000, which is £5,000 higher than in 2008/10 and £10,000 higher than in 2006/08 (ONS, *Wealth in Great Britain* 2014). Even in the face of recession and an anaemic recovery households mortgage debts are still growing quickly.

In addition to indebtedness through large mortgage loans, financialisation created new ways to convert an asset into debt in the form of home equity withdrawal (HEW). HEW takes two main forms: (1) equity release enables households to borrow against the value of their home that is already owned outright (like the Home for Life Plans) which specifically targets older and/or retired home owners; (2) equity borrowing involves converting the equity stake in the home into more mortgage debt, or more problematically increased mortgage borrowing against the increased ‘paper’ value of the home. Home equity withdrawal is recognisable part of asset-based welfare strategies that promote new financial instruments that allow households to convert assets into debt to smooth out income fluctuations over time, in other words to provide a welfare function. Equity withdrawal became a significant driver of consumption and economic growth: from 2002–07 HEW was approximately 4 per cent of GDP, peaking in 2003 at nearly £63 billion, equivalent to 9 per cent of consumer spending (Froud *et al.* 2011). According to the Family Resources Survey (2009-10) 34 per cent of homeowners who were still repaying a mortgage had borrowed equity from their homes at some point since they purchased them; the main reasons why people borrow equity: 57.6% used HEW for reinvestment in the home (improvements or repairs), while 42.4% was for non-housing expenditure, such as for purchasing major items (9.8%) or undefined ‘other purposes’ (22.5%) (*Wealth Gap Briefing* No. 1, 2013).

Asset-based welfare systematically facilitated home owners ‘banking’ on their homes—using it not only for consumption but increasingly as a safety-net (Montgomerie 2013; Lowe 2012). By substituting privately owned housing wealth for collectively funded safety-nets many UK households are simply seeking to securing access to privately supplied services and supporting their family’s welfare needs across the life-course—a direct result of asset-based welfare strategies (Wood et al 2013). Even households with asset holdings—those supposedly more financially secure than households without any assets—there are pronounced inequalities between those are asset rich and those with leveraged vehicle vulnerable to every manner of shock.

Contingencies of financialisation—the temporal and special limits of housing-based welfare

There is a long history of links between housing and the British growth regime (Hamnet 1990; Hills 1998; Kemp 1999; Lund 2002), including how it was inexorably part of the recent boom, bubble and bust (Whitehead *et al.* 2005; Quilgars and Jones 2007; Watson 2010). This section extends the argument on financialisation of housing in the UK by claiming that it is a unique set of political and economic circumstances that cannot be repeated, therefore current gains from residential housing are a one-off wealth windfall. The temporal and spatial limits of gains from residential housing mean the same conditions cannot be repeated (often enough) in the way required for residential housing to provide a generalizable welfare function. To fully understand the complexity of issues at play we need to go beyond the immediate housing issues and consider the interaction between housing and wider social, economic and demographic shifts (Ronald and Elsinga 2012).

It is widely acknowledged that the UK housing market is highly volatile (Stephens 2011), especially compared to its European counterparts (Doling and Ronald 2010b), and oscillating prices make the timing of market entry and exit an important factors in realising gains from homeownership. Figure 3 provides a simple illustration of long-term national average house prices to demonstrate that the timing of entry and exit in the UK residential market is crucial to determining the scale and scope of gains and losses for households. It shows clearly the rising swell of house prices, but as a long-run national average the graph smooth-out the peaks and troughs and obscures the significant regional variations. However, we can see how those entering the housing market any time before the 1970s would have seen the most spectacular gains: in 1975 the average house cost £11, 288 and triples to £32,543 by 1985. The post-war house building expansion and the *Right-to-Buy* scheme put downward pressure on house prices, making home ownership more affordable for middle- and lower-income groups and creating the largest increases in homeownership rates. The previous housing boom saw peak-to-trough average house price move from £61, 495 in 1989 to £52,114 in 1994. When the next bubble began apace in 2000, the housing market had already well above the last peak at £81,628 and rapidly accelerated upward; by 2003 national average house price was £133,903 reaching the market peak in 2008 at £183, 959 and flattening back down to £162,971 in 2010.

**Figure 3: National House Price Index 1952–2009**

The wider condition in the economy, from the state of the housing stock to access to finance, that make the current state of wealth gains from housing a one-off windfall. For example, social housing stock was not replaced and largely starved of long-term investment after the Right-to-Buy scheme was implemented, so only one particular cohort of tenants had access to the national sell-off of social housing. Most importantly the prevailing political and economic conditions of buoyant employment markets, adequate welfare provision and regulated financial markets allowed housing to provide a welfare function; however, these conditions will not be repeated.

Failing to acknowledge the contingent temporalities of financialisation in the UK effectively means that the past thirty years of wealth gains in homeownership are used to generalise about gains over the next thirty years. As such housing-based welfare strategies simply assume that if spectacular housing gains happened once it will happen again. However, we argue that welfare and/or wealth gains from UK housing market cannot be replicated, generalised or transferred because they are contingent on specific temporal and spatial factors. In practice, the temporalities of financialisation translates into specific conditions that shape different cohorts relationship to housing. For example, older cohorts entered the housing market at the best time: property prices were low and even if they initially paid much higher interest rates on mortgage loans, they did so on much smaller principle and benefited from Mortgage Interest Tax Relief (MITR); the housing bubble brought high prices and falling interest rates so many of these households are actually repaying a larger amount principle. By comparison, younger cohorts entering the housing market post-2000 would, depending on the year and location, paid much more for housing and any gains of lower interest rates would be off-set by the substantially larger amounts borrowed without any tax relief on loan repayments.

The temporal constraints on realising wealth gains from housing creates pronounced intergenerational inequalities—seriously undermining the ability of housing to deliver asset-based wealth gains, let alone provide a welfare function over the life-cycle of individuals that enter the housing market at different times. Housing ‘choices’ are ultimately constrained by wider societal structures, which in turn shape the tenure options available to individuals and families (McKee 2012). Sustained house price inflation punctuated with periods of intense price volatility has created our present-day affordability trap. In particular young adults are being excluded from accessing the housing ladder with research highlighting a declining rate of entry into owner–occupation amongst the under-thirties (Clapham et al. 2010; Heath 2008) and the rate of homeownership amongst this cohort has halved since 1980, falling from 18 per cent in 1980 to 9 per cent in 2007 (Wilcox 2010). Increasingly young adults have only private rental accommodation—labelled ‘generation rent’ by the media (Guardian, 2012)—which is comparatively more expensive with far less security compared to social housing tenants (ECOTEC 2009; Rugg 1999). In many instances young people attempt to mitigate the cost of private renting by sharing housing facilities with non-related adults in ‘non-family’ living arrangements (Heath 2008).

Therefore, those groups within society that ‘missed’ the key windows of entry into the housing market have limited possibilities of accessing homeownership in the first place, let alone realising the same level of gains accrued by those groups that did entre the housing market at the right time. The problem of affordability and its implications for wealth accumulation the over the life-cycle demonstrate the problem of asset-based welfare: it depends on a continuous upward trajectory of house prices and, in doing so, simply reinforces existing social inequalities. For instance, there is a new turn toward family wealth—with all its gendered, racial and class implications—in accessing the UK housing market. We know that the number of mortgages issued to first-time buyers has steadily declined since the early 2000s (Smith *et al.* 2005), while, increasingly, first-time home buyers rely on family wealth to raise a deposit (DCLG 2010: 18). ‘Gifted deposits’ are one-off transfers that are entirely dependent upon wealth and generosity of an individual’s family that operates without any tax incentives (Clarke 2008). A stark contrast between assisted and unassisted buyers supports claims that inequality in access to homeownership is widening, with the wealthy most likely to be able to access homeownership (Williams 2010). This trend demonstrates the new inequalities of access to the UK housing market; many households will simply be excluded from homeownership because they do not have sufficient family wealth to get on the housing ladder in the first place (Appleyard and Rowlingson 2010).

This wealth-effect for older homeowners comes at a direct cost for younger generations in the form of higher mortgage debts: ‘the huge increase in saving by one part of the population was [sic] broadly matched by a big increase in borrowing by another part’ (Griffith 2011: 14). In other words, ‘what has seemed to them [older home-owners] like manna from heaven is in fact financed by the younger people to whom they sell their houses’ (Weale 2007: 5). Current intergenerational inequality is only exacerbates by the wider economic problems associated with the aging ‘baby boomer’ population and the additional demands this will put on welfare budgets and services. Confronted with a shrinking pension income and longer life expectancy, as well as a highly uncertain and overpriced rented sector, older homeowners are holding on to their family homes rather than cashing out on their one-off windfall gain from selling their residence. This manifests in the significant under-occupation of housing among older households; thus, under-occupation by childless couples or older single people is directly linked to overcrowding amongst young and growing families (Griffith 2011). This holding pattern among older households, attempting to deal with their own uncertain future, has significant effects on younger households, especially their ability to realise their own wealth gains from homeownership.

Promoting homeownership creates new inequalities within and across generations: ‘baby boomers’ have disproportionately gained from housing policies like *Right-to-Buy* and *Mortgage Interest Tax Relief* while the current generation of young people remain ‘housing poor’ (McKee 2011). Housing-based welfare has made household family dynamics a more important indicator of access to the housing ladder. Housing equity is both the single largest source of family funding of elderly care and first-time buyer deposits (Searle 2011; Smith and Searle 2008). Therefore, it is important to reflect on the intimate links between housing and ‘the household’ or the set of relationships that shape social reproduction; for instance, formal and informal family practices that support entry to homeownership reﬂect broader shifts to family-based welfare akin to welfare regimes in East Asia and Southern Europe (Poggio 2012; Ronald 2008). The financialisation of housing is shifting welfare provision from the government to the household in a way that is not widely acknowledged or analysed in current conceptualisations of asset-based welfare in the UK.

In addition to the pronounced temporal contingencies of financialised housing there are significant spatial constraints as well. The long-term demographic shift toward urban and suburban living, combined with the patterns of economic growth and decline in the UK, creates real spatial constraints on realising gains from housing. Britain’s de-industrialisation and promotion of service sector, especially financial services, left many communities and regions outside of London and the South East without any economic backbone. Public sector growth, especially in the North of England, Wales and Scotland under New Labour, sought to stem the tide of economic decay; however, the 2007 financial crisis, Great Recession and age of austerity have systematically pulled back these gains and revived old patterns of regional economic disparity. As such, the regeneration of the North made possible by the credit and asset bubble exacerbated, not ameliorated, existing geographically disparities in the UK housing market. Figure 4 illustrates these regional disparities: whilst individual regions are by no means coherent, trends in the housing market vary most distinctly between London and the South compared to the Midlands and in stark contrast to the North and Devolved Regions of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.

**Figure 4. Average sale prices by selected UK country and region, 1992–2008**

Figure 4 shows that while the housing bubble occurred across the UK, it largely perpetuated existing inequalities between regions or did not allow other regions to catch-up with London and the South. During the boom years, lower house price inflation and easy access to credit made homeownership an attractive choice for households in low-demand areas in the North in fact, purchasing a home was in many cases more affordable than renting in the social rented sector (Vickers *et al.* 2003). As the boom gathered pace, from 2003 onward, the affordability ratio in the North between social renting and ownership reversed, making it significantly more expensive to own (Ferrari and Rae, 2011). When the housing market stalled in the wake of the financial crisis and austerity began to take hold, housing prices in the North continued to fall while London and the South East experienced no sustained downturn in house prices. The relative economic disparity between London, the South East and the rest of the UK has contributed to a renewed overheating of the residential property market.

There are clearly groups in society that have realised meaningful wealth gains from housing: those entering the housing market at a particular time, buying in urban and suburban areas, particularly in London and the South East. However, the temporal, spatial and social constraints present in the UK housing market suggest that relying on homeownership as a form of asset-based welfare does not work as a mechanism for transmitting wealth gains to households in order to provide financial security.

Towards an everyday political economy of housing

Our analysis of housing centred asset-based welfare strategies in the UK demonstrates the significant constraints that limit who, when and where gains from housing can be realised. These claims open-up to a wider discussion about using the everyday political economy as lens to analyse the economy as social practice. The case of housing points to an underlying tension: we know that housing is a significant part the finance-led welfare/growth regime, but with little by way of detailed analysis of how housing finance and welfare are enacted in everyday life. Instead, abstractions about welfare regimes give way to generalised abstractions about whole populations, without acknowledging how this limits the analytical purchase of the everyday. Watson (2010) explicitly addresses the high level of abstraction required to draw links between housing systems and the contradictions of the modern investor subject:

It is the emergent properties of a newly constituted, but still merely tendential, relationship between the model homeowner, the model welfare recipient and private financial institutions that is of most concern. The argument is not that this relationship now dictates the content of everyday economic experiences for everyone in the UK, only that the trajectory of recent policy changes renders exposure to this relationship much more likely (414).

The UK has well-established social, regional, economic and intergenerational inequalities which poses serious problems with generalizing about ‘the everyday’, especially if these differences are not taken into account. In many ways an everyday political economy framework provides the most fruitful framework for understanding the relevant inter-linkages that make house-price Keynesianism work, at least for a time, and how housing has become part of a wider ‘housing-based welfare’ strategy (Groves *et al.* 2009; Doling and Ronald 2010a; Watson 2009).

At present the everyday analysis of housing remains very opaque: national policy objectives are read into average national housing market trends to produce recognisable patterns within the housing and/or the household sector. These abstract generalisations contradict what we know to be true: the everyday experiences of housing and finance are contingent on the spaces, places and people that negotiate them. If the everyday political economy is to be a meaningful lens to analyse housing as part of a financialised growth model, then it must include a more detailed engagement with the significant differences across societies that matter when enacting (or matter in the choices made in) everyday life. This echoes LeBaron’s (2010) call for everyday political economy to take seriously the gender, race and class dynamics of contemporary capitalism long detailed in the feminist political economy literature.

This article explores specific temporal, spatial and social contingencies of housing to demonstrate how financialisation materialises in everyday life. These insights complement existing analysis of the significant role social inequality plays in determining who has access to credit, housing and its potential wealth benefits: specifically, how gender, race and class are well-recognised social barriers to access to financial services, credit and homeownership (Dymski 2009, Montgomerie and Young 2009, Leyshon et al., 2008). Feminist political economy clearly articulates how the replacement of gendered subjects with the abstract ‘market citizen’ perpetuates gender-based inequalities in labour markets, the division of unpaid labour and asset ownership (Fraser 1994; Elson and Cagatay 2000; Bakker 2003; Bezanson and Luxton 2006). Also, how financialised growth across Anglo-America perpetuated these inequalities in terms of access to mortgage credit and homeownership (Roberts 2013).

Therefore, the important next step is for an everyday political economy of homeownership that disaggregates the places, spaces and bodies that enact everyday life, and by doing so no longer reproduces generalised assumptions about individual preferences or financial subjectivities that are divorced from the temporal, spatial and social context that actually matter in determining daily life. ‘The home’ is the socio-economic foundation of the economy, where production, consumption and social reproduction coalesce to create national output. Pronounced social inequalities in Britain make access to credit and housing highly contingent on specific socio-economic factors, while having access by no means guarantees housing wealth will accrue, let alone provide a welfare function over the life-cycle.

Conclusion

Depending on whether the emphasis is on the long trajectory of crisis-ridden neoliberalism or the conjectural dynamics of the post-2001 financialised economy, there is consensus that the UK is in a protracted economic stagnation. It turns out that inflating the economy through debt-financed consumption creates a significant downsides: namely, rising debt levels for significant portion of households. It is not just those that participated in the housing bubble but also those households that used home equity withdrawal to convert stocks of assets into stocks of debt in the upswing which, in turn, precipitated a balance sheet recession in the downswing. Indebtedness is a pernicious problem in Anglo-American growth model that threatens not only wider financial stability but social cohesion because debt, not housing wealth, is the source of welfare and social provision.

There is limited scope for dealing with protracted downside of indebtedness when the new Austerity agenda creates new problems without solving the existing ones. The Coalition government consistently seeks to solve economic problems, for example the housing crisis, with the same solution: more debt for households. Various iterations of the *Help-to-Buy* schemes included government-backed ‘equity’ loans leaving homeowners with two debt payments (and in the case of fees to the housing association), shared-ownership schemes and Home-for-Life plans for senior citizens. These new policies initiatives imagine new ways of boosting the housing market without dealing with existing regional inequalities, urban-suburban and rural disparities, affordability or the highly leveraged households already struggling to cope with fallout from the last residential property boom.

Housing was at the heart of the financial collapse, and the UK economy is now precariously reliant on the housing market. Echoing Danny Dorling (2014): housing is the defining issue of our times. As this article shows, it cannot be plausibly argued that the UK is moving towards a property-owning democracy. Rather, housing-based welfare means many households appear wealthy while being definitively more financially insecure. The financialisation of homeownership means wealth gains for a select group who bought at the right time and the right place and dire consequences for those who buy the wrong house, at the wrong price or in the wrong place—at best, they look forward to years of indebtedness, possibly negative equity and, at worst, bankruptcy or homelessness. However, it is a mistake to believe the solutions to the failures of housing-based welfare are in reforms to housing market because, as this article articulates, the problems that need fixing are in the wider political economy of inequality that defines the current crisis of financialised growth in Britain.

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